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Abstract
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCGmechanism (also
known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms.
Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under
such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting
in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. We consider the following problem: within
the family of Groves mechanisms, we want to identify mechanisms that give the agents the
highest utilities, under the constraint that these mechanisms must never incur deficits.
We adopt a prior-free approach. We introduce two general measures for comparing
mechanisms in prior-free settings. We say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism M in-
dividually dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M ′ if for every type profile,
every agent’s utility under M is no less than that under M ′, and this holds with strict
inequality for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that a non-deficit Groves
mechanism M collectively dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M ′ if for every
type profile, the agents’ total utility under M is no less than that under M ′, and this holds
with strict inequality for at least one type profile. The above definitions induce two partial
orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We study the maximal elements corresponding
to these two partial orders, which we call the individually undominated mechanisms and
the collectively undominated mechanisms, respectively.
1. Introduction
Mechanism design is often employed for coordinating group decision making among agents.
Often, such mechanisms impose payments that agents have to pay to a central authority.
Although maximizing revenue is a desirable objective in many settings (for example, if the
mechanism is an auction designed by the seller), it is not desirable in situations where no
entity is profiting from the payments. Some examples include public project problems as well
as certain resource allocation problems without a seller (e.g., the right to use a shared good in
a given time slot, or the assignment of take-off slots among airline companies). In such cases,
we would like to have mechanisms that minimize payments (or, even better, achieve budget
balance), while maintaining other desirable properties, such as being efficient, strategy-proof
and non-deficit (i.e., the mechanism does not need to be funded by an external source).
c©2013 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also
known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. In
many sufficiently general settings, including the settings that we will study in this paper,
the Groves mechanisms are the only efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms (Holmstro¨m,
1979). Unfortunately though, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced.
That is, under such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents,
resulting in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. Motivated by this we consider in
this paper the following problem: within the family of Groves mechanisms, we want to
identify mechanisms that give the agents the highest utilities, under the constraint that
these mechanisms never incur deficits.1
We adopt a prior-free approach, where each agent i knows only his own valuation vi,
and there is no prior probability distribution over the other agents’ values. We introduce
two natural measures for comparing mechanisms in prior-free settings. Given a performance
indicator, we say that mechanismM individually dominates mechanismM ′ if for every type
profile of the agents, M performs no worse than M ′ from the perspective of each individual
agent, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile and one agent.
We say that mechanism M collectively dominates mechanism M ′ if for every type profile,
M performs no worse than M ′ from the perspective of the set of agents as a whole, and
this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. In this paper, we focus on
maximizing the agents’ utilities. Given this specific performance indicator, individual and
collective dominance are determined by comparing either individual utilities or the sum of
the agents’ utilities, respectively.
The above definitions induce two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. Our
goal in this work is to identify and study the maximal elements corresponding to these two
partial orders, which we call the individually undominated (non-deficit Groves) mechanisms
and the collectively undominated (non-deficit Groves) mechanisms, respectively. It should be
noted that the partial orders we focus on may be different from the partial orders induced by
other performance indicators, e.g., if the criterion is the revenue extracted from the agents.
1.1 Structure of the Paper
The presentation of our results is structured as follows: In Sections 2 and 3, we formally
define the notions of individual and collective dominance, as well as the family of Groves
mechanisms, and then provide some basic observations. We also establish some general
properties of anonymous Groves mechanisms which we use later on, and which may be
of independent interest. We then begin our study of individual dominance in Section 4,
where we give a characterization of individually undominated mechanisms. We also propose
two techniques for transforming any given non-deficit Groves mechanism into one that is
individually undominated.
In Sections 5 and 6 we study the question of finding collectively undominated mech-
anisms in two settings. The first (Section 5) is auctions of multiple identical units with
unit-demand bidders. In this setting, the VCG mechanism is collectively dominated by
1. The agents’ utilities may be further increased if we also consider mechanisms outside of the Groves
family (Guo & Conitzer, 2008a; de Clippel, Naroditskiy, & Greenwald, 2009; Faltings, 2005; Guo,
Naroditskiy, Conitzer, Greenwald, & Jennings, 2011), but in this paper we take efficiency as a hard
constraint.
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other non-deficit Groves mechanisms, such as the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism (Bailey, 1997;
Cavallo, 2006). We obtain a complete characterization of collectively undominated mecha-
nisms that are anonymous and linear (meaning that the redistribution is a linear function
of the ordered type profile; see Section 5 for the definition). In particular, we show that
the collectively undominated mechanisms that are anonymous and linear are exactly the
Optimal-in-Expectation Linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms, which include the Bailey-
Cavallo mechanism and were introduced by Guo and Conitzer (2010). The second setting
(Section 6) is public project problems, where agents must decide on whether and how to
finance a project. We show that in the case where the agents have identical participa-
tion costs, the VCG mechanism is collectively undominated. On the other hand, when the
participation costs can be different across agents, there exist mechanisms that collectively
dominate VCG. We finally show that when the participation costs are different across agents,
the VCG mechanism remains collectively undominated among all pay-only mechanisms.
1.2 Related Work
How to efficiently allocate resources among a group of competing agents is a well-studied
topic in economics literature. For example, the famous Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (My-
erson & Satterthwaite, 1983) rules out the existence of efficient, Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patible, budget-balanced, and individually rational mechanisms. Cramton, Gibbons, and
Klemperer (1987) characterized the Bayes-Nash incentive compatible and individually ratio-
nal mechanisms for dissolving a partnership, and gave the necessary and sufficient condition
for the possibility of dissolving partnership efficiently.
The main difference between these papers and ours is that we adopt a prior-free ap-
proach. That is, we do not assume that we know the prior distribution of the agents’
valuations. As a result of this, our notion of truthfulness is strategy-proofness, which is
stronger than Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. In many sufficiently general settings,
including the settings that we will study in this paper, the Groves mechanisms are the only
efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms (Holmstro¨m, 1979). That is, the search of undom-
inated Groves mechanisms is, in many settings, the search of efficient, strategy-proof, and
non-deficit mechanisms that are closest to budget-balance.
Recently, there has been a series of works on VCG redistribution mechanisms, which
are mechanisms that make social decisions according to the efficient and strategy-proof
VCG mechanism, and then redistribute some of the VCG payments back to the agents,
under certain constraints, such as that an agent’s redistribution should be independent
of his own type (therefore ensuring strategy-proofness), and that the total redistribution
should never exceed the total VCG payment (therefore ensuring non-deficit). Actually,
any non-deficit Groves mechanism can be interpreted as such a VCG-based redistribution
mechanism, and any (non-deficit) VCG redistribution mechanism corresponds to a non-
deficit Groves mechanism (more details on this are provided in Section 2).
One example of a redistribution mechanism is the Bailey-Cavallo (BC) mechanism (Cav-
allo, 2006).2 Under the BC mechanism, every agent, besides participating in the VCG
2. In settings that are revenue monotonic, the Cavallo (2006) mechanism coincides with a mechanism
discovered earlier by Bailey (1997). The Bailey-Cavallo mechanism for a single-item auction was also
independently discovered by Porter, Shoham, and Tennenholtz (2004).
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mechanism, also receives 1
n
times the minimal VCG revenue that could have been obtained
by changing this agent’s own bid. In some settings (e.g., a single-item auction), the BC
mechanism can successfully redistribute a large portion of the VCG payments back to the
agents. That is, in such settings, the BC mechanism both individually and collectively
dominates the VCG mechanism.
Guo and Conitzer (2009) proposed another VCG redistribution mechanism called the
worst-case optimal (WCO) redistribution mechanism, in the setting of multi-unit auctions
with nonincreasing marginal values. WCO is optimal in terms of the fraction of total VCG
payment redistributed in the worst case.3 Moulin (2009) independently derived WCO under
a slightly different worst-case optimality notion (in the more restrictive setting of multi-unit
auctions with unit demand only). Guo and Conitzer (2010) also proposed a family of VCG
redistribution mechanisms that aim to maximize the expected amount of VCG payment
redistributed, in the setting of multi-unit auctions with unit demand. The members of this
family are called the Optimal-in-Expectation Linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms.
Finally, the paper that is the closest to what we study here is an early work by Moulin on
collectively undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms (Moulin, 1986). It deals with the
problem of selecting an efficient public decision out of finitely many costless alternatives.4
Each agent submits to the central authority his utility for each alternative. Subsequently,
the central authority makes a decision that maximizes the social welfare. Moulin (1986,
Lemma 2) showed that the VCGmechanism is collectively undominated in the above setting.
This result generalizes an earlier result for the case of two public decisions by Laffont and
Maskin (1997).
2. Preliminaries
We first briefly review payment-based mechanisms (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston, &
Green, 1995).
2.1 Payment-Based Mechanisms
Assume that there is a set of possible outcomes or decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n} of agents
where n ≥ 2, and for each agent i, a set of types Θi and an (initial) utility function
vi : D ×Θi→ R. Let Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn.
In a (direct revelation) mechanism, each agent reports a type θi ∈ Θi and based on this,
the mechanism selects an outcome and a payment to be made by every agent. Hence a
mechanism is given by a pair of functions (f, t), where f is the decision function and t is the
payment function that determines the agents’ payments, i.e., f : Θ→D, and t : Θ→ Rn.
We put ti(θ) := (t(θ))i, i.e., the function ti computes the payment of agent i. For each
vector θ of announced types, if ti(θ) ≥ 0, agent i pays ti(θ), and if ti(θ) < 0, he receives
|ti(θ)|. When the true type of agent i is θi and his announced type is θ
′
i, his final utility
function is defined by
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) := vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi)− ti(θ
′
i, θ−i),
3. This notion of worst-case optimality was also studied for more general settings (Gujar & Narahari, 2011;
Guo, 2011, 2012).
4. In our public project model, there is a cost associated with building the project.
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where θ−i is the vector of types announced by the other agents.
2.2 Properties of Payment-Based Mechanisms
We say that a payment-based mechanism (f, t) is
• efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d ∈ D,
∑n
i=1 vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi),
• budget-balanced if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ,
• non-deficit if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ, i.e., the mechanism does not need to be funded
by an external source,
• pay-only if ti(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n},
• strategy-proof if for all θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, and θ′i,
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi),
i.e., for each agent i, reporting a false type, here θ′i, is not profitable.
2.3 Individual and Collective Dominance
We consider prior-free settings, where each agent i knows only his own function vi, and
there is no belief or prior probability distribution regarding the other agents’ initial utilities.
Payment-based mechanisms can naturally be compared in terms of either the effect on each
individual agent or the global effect on the whole set of agents. We therefore introduce
two measures for comparing such mechanisms. Given a performance indicator5, we say
that mechanism (f ′, t′) individually dominates mechanism (f, t) if for every type profile,
(f ′, t′) performs no worse than (f, t) from the perspective of every agent, and this holds
with strict inequality for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that mechanism
(f ′, t′) collectively dominates mechanism (f, t) if for every type profile, (f ′, t′) performs no
worse than (f, t) from the perspective of the whole agent system, and this holds with strict
inequality for at least one type profile. In this paper, we focus on maximizing the agents’
utilities. Given this specific performance indicator, individual and collective dominance are
captured by the following definitions:
Definition 2.1 Given two payment-based mechanisms (f, t) and (f ′, t′), we say that (f ′, t′)
individually dominates (f, t) if
• for all θ ∈ Θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ui((f, t)(θ), θi) ≤ ui((f
′, t′)(θ), θi),
• for some θ ∈ Θ and some i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ui((f, t)(θ), θi) < ui((f
′, t′)(θ), θi).
Definition 2.2 Given two payment-based mechanisms (f, t) and (f ′, t′), we say that (f ′, t′)
collectively dominates (f, t) if
5. By a performance indicator we mean a function of the mechanism’s outcome that serves as a measure
for comparing mechanisms. E.g., it can be the final utility of an agent, or an arbitrary function of it,
or a function of the agent’s payment or any other function that depends on the decision rule and the
payment rule of the mechanism.
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• for all θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ui((f, t)(θ), θi) ≤
∑n
i=1 ui((f
′, t′)(θ), θi),
• for some θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ui((f, t)(θ), θi) <
∑n
i=1 ui((f
′, t′)(θ), θi).
For two payment-based mechanisms (f, t) and (f ′, t′), clearly if (f ′, t′) individually dom-
inates (f, t), then it also collectively dominates (f, t). Theorem 3.4 shows that the reverse
implication however does not need to hold, even if we limit ourselves to special types of
mechanisms. That is, the fact that (f ′, t′) collectively dominates (f, t) does not imply that
(f ′, t′) individually dominates (f, t).
Given a set Z of payment-based mechanisms, individual and collective dominance induce
two partial orders on Z, and we are interested in studying the maximal elements with
respect to these partial orders. A maximal element with respect to the first partial order
will be called an individually undominated mechanism, i.e., it is a mechanism that is not
individually dominated by any other mechanism in Z. A maximal element for the second
partial order will be called a collectively undominated mechanism, i.e., it is a mechanism
that is not collectively dominated by any other mechanism in Z. The maximal elements
with respect to the two partial orders may differ and in particular, the notion of collectively
undominated mechanisms is generally a stronger notion. Clearly, if (f ′, t′) ∈ Z is collectively
undominated, then it is also individually undominated. The reverse may not be true,
examples of which are provided in Section 4.2.
If we focus on the same decision function f , then individual and collective dominance are
strictly due to the difference of the payment functions. Hence, (f, t′) individually dominates
(f, t) (or simply t′ individually dominates t) if and only if
• for all θ ∈ Θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ti(θ) ≥ t
′
i(θ), and
• for some θ ∈ Θ and some i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ti(θ) > t
′
i(θ),
and t′ collectively dominates t if
• for all θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i(θ), and
• for some θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) >
∑n
i=1 t
′
i(θ).
We now define two transformations on payment-based mechanisms originating from the
same decision function. Both transformations build upon the surplus-guarantee concept
(Cavallo, 2006) for the specific case of the VCG mechanism6.
Consider a payment-based mechanism (f, t). Given θ = (θ1, . . ., θn), let T (θ) be the
total amount of payments, i.e., T (θ) :=
∑n
i=1 ti(θ). For each i ∈ {1, . . ., n} let
SBCGCi (θ−i) := inf
θ′i∈Θi
T (θ′i, θ−i).
In other words, SBCGCi (θ−i) is the surplus guarantee independent of the report of agent i.
We then define the payment-based mechanism (f, tBCGC) by setting for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
tBCGCi (θ) := ti(θ)−
SBCGCi (θ−i)
n
.
6. The first transformation was originally defined by Bailey (1997) and Cavallo (2006) for the specific case
of the VCG mechanism and by Guo and Conitzer (2008b) for non-deficit Groves mechanisms. We call
it the BCGC transformation after the authors of these papers (Bailey, Cavallo, Guo, Conitzer).
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Also, for a fixed agent j, we define the payment-based mechanism (f, tBCGC(j)) by
setting for i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
t
BCGC(j)
i (θ) :=
{
ti(θ)− S
BCGC
i (θ−i) if i = j
ti(θ) if i 6= j
After the first transformation (from (f, t) to (f, tBCGC)), every agent receives an addi-
tional7 amount of 1
n
times the surplus guarantee independent of his own type. During the
second transformation (from (f, t) to (f, tBCGC(j)), agent j is chosen to be the only agent
who receives an additional amount. This additional amount equals the entirety of the sur-
plus guarantee independent of j’s own type. For both transformations the agents’ additional
payments are independent of their own types, thus the strategy-proofness is maintained: if
(f, t) is strategy-proof, then so are (f, tBCGC) and (f, tBCGC(j)) for all j.
The following observations generalize some of the earlier results by Bailey (1997) and
Cavallo (2006).
Proposition 2.3
(i) Each payment-based mechanism of the form tBCGC is non-deficit.
(ii) If t is non-deficit, then either t and tBCGC coincide or tBCGC individually (and hence
also collectively) dominates t.
Proof. (i) For all θ and i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have T (θ) ≥ SBCGCi (θ−i), so
TBCGC(θ) =
n∑
i=1
tBCGCi (θ) = T (θ)−
n∑
i=1
SBCGCi (θ−i)
n
=
n∑
i=1
T (θ)− SBCGCi (θ−i)
n
≥ 0.
(ii) If t is non-deficit, then for all θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have SBCGCi (θ−i) ≥ 0, and
hence tBCGCi (θ) ≤ ti(θ). 2
The same claims hold for tBCGC(j) for j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, with equally simple proofs.
3. Groves Mechanisms
We first briefly review Groves mechanisms.
3.1 Preliminaries
Recall that a Groves (1973) Mechanism is a payment-based mechanism (f, t) such that
the following hold8:
7. Receiving an additional positive amount means paying less and receiving an additional negative amount
means paying more.
8. Here and below
∑
j 6=i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, j 6= i.
135
Guo, Markakis, Apt, & Conitzer
• f(θ) ∈ argmaxd∈D
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi), i.e., the chosen outcome maximizes the allocation
welfare (the agents’ total valuation),
• ti : Θ→ R is defined by ti(θ) := hi(θ−i)− gi(θ), where
• gi(θ) :=
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ), θj),
• hi : Θ−i→ R is an arbitrary function.
So gi(θ) represents the allocation welfare from the decision f(θ) with agent i ignored.
Recall now the following crucial result (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
Groves Theorem (Groves, 1973) Every Groves mechanism is efficient and strategy-
proof.
For several decision problems, the only efficient and strategy-proof payment-based mech-
anisms are Groves mechanisms. This is implied by a general result by Holmstro¨m (1979),
which covers the two domains that we consider in Sections 5 and 6, and explains our focus
on Groves mechanisms. Hence from now on, we use the term “mechanism” to refer to a
Groves mechanism.
Focusing on the set of non-deficit Groves mechanisms, individually (respectively, collec-
tively) undominated mechanisms are the mechanisms from this set that are not individually
(respectively, collectively) dominated by any other non-deficit Groves mechanism. As men-
tioned earlier, no matter which domain and which set of mechanisms we consider, collective
undominance always implies individual undominance. In Section 4.2 we show two exam-
ples of single-item auction scenarios, where collective undominance is strictly stronger than
individual undominance, for non-deficit Groves mechanisms. That is, there exists an indi-
vidually undominated non-deficit Groves mechanism that is collectively dominated.
Recall that a special Groves mechanism, called the VCG or Clarke (1971) mechanism,
is obtained using9
hi(θ−i) := max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj).
In this case
ti(θ) := max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj),
which shows that the VCG mechanism is pay-only.
In what follows we introduce a slightly different notation to describe Groves mechanisms,
that makes the rest of our presentation more convenient. First, we denote the payment
function ti of the VCG mechanism by V CGi. Note now that each Groves mechanism (f, t)
can be defined in terms of the VCG mechanism by setting ti(θ) := V CGi(θ)−ri(θ−i), where
ri : Θ−i→ R is some function of θ−i. We refer then to r := (r1, . . ., rn) as a redistribution
function . Hence each Groves mechanism can be identified with a redistribution function r
and can be viewed as the VCG mechanism combined with a redistribution. That is, under
r the agents first participate in the VCG mechanism. Then, on top of that, agent i also
9. Here and below, whenever D is not a finite set, in order to ensure that the considered maximum exists,
we assume that f is continuous, and so is vi for each i, and also that the set D and all Θi are compact
subsets of some Rk.
136
Undominated Groves Mechanisms
receives a redistribution amount equal to ri(θ−i). By definition, a Groves mechanism r is
non-deficit iff
∑n
i=1 V CGi(θ) ≥
∑n
i=1 ri(θ−i) for all θ ∈ Θ.
3.2 Dominance Relations
Using the new notation above, individual and collective dominance (among non-deficit
Groves mechanisms) can be described as follows:
Definition 3.1 A non-deficit Groves mechanism r′ individually dominates another non-
deficit Groves mechanism r if
• for all i and all θ, r′i(θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i),
• for some i and some θ, r′i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i).
Definition 3.2 A non-deficit Groves mechanism r′ collectively dominates another non-
deficit Groves mechanism r if
• for all θ,
∑
i r
′
i(θ−i) ≥
∑
i ri(θ−i),
• for some θ,
∑
i r
′
i(θ−i) >
∑
i ri(θ−i).
We now consider the mechanism that results from applying the BCGC transformation
to the VCG mechanism. We refer to this as the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism or simply the
BC mechanism (Bailey, 1997; Cavallo, 2006). The VCG mechanism is characterized by
the constant redistribution function rVCG = (0, 0, . . ., 0). After the BCGC transformation,
every agent i receives an additional amount of 1
n
times the surplus guarantee SBCGCi (θ−i),
independent of his own type. That is, the BC mechanism is also a Groves mechanism, and
its redistribution function is
rBC = (
1
n
SBCGC1 ,
1
n
SBCGC2 , . . .,
1
n
SBCGCn ).
Let θ′ := (θ1, . . ., θi−1, θ
′
i, θi+1, . . ., θn). Then starting from the VCG mechanism, we
have
SBCGCi (θ−i) = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi
n∑
k=1

max
d∈D
∑
j 6=k
vj(d, θ
′
j)−
∑
j 6=k
vj(f(θ
′), θ′j)

 ,
that is,
SBCGCi (θ−i) = inf
θ′
i
∈Θi

 n∑
k=1
max
d∈D
∑
j 6=k
vj(d, θ
′
j)− (n− 1)
n∑
k=1
vk(f(θ
′), θ′k)

 (1)
In many settings, we have that for all θ and for all i, SBCGCi (θ−i) = 0, and consequently
the VCG and BC mechanisms coincide (e.g., see Proposition 6.1). Whenever they do not,
by Proposition 2.3(ii), BC individually and collectively dominates VCG. This is the case
for the single-item auction, as it can be seen that there SBCGCi (θ−i) = [θ−i]2, where [θ−i]2
is the second-highest bid among bids other than agent i’s own bid.
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3.3 Anonymous Groves Mechanisms
Some of the proofs of our main results are obtained by arguing first about a special class of
Groves mechanisms, called anonymous Groves mechanisms. We provide here some results
about this class that we will utilize in later sections. We call a function f : An→B
permutation independent if for all permutations π of {1, . . ., n}, f = f ◦ π. Following
Moulin (1986), we call a Groves mechanism r = (r1, . . ., rn) anonymous
10 if
• all type sets Θi are equal,
• all functions ri coincide and each of them is permutation independent.
Hence, an anonymous Groves mechanism is uniquely determined by a single function r :
Θn−1 → R.
In general, the VCG mechanism is not anonymous. But it is anonymous when all the
type sets are equal and all the initial utility functions vi coincide. This is the case in the
two domains that we consider in later sections.
For any θ ∈ Θ and any permutation π of {1, . . ., n} we define θpi ∈ Θ by letting
θpii := θpi−1(i).
Denote by Π(k) the set of all permutations of the set {1, . . ., k}. Given a Groves mech-
anism r := (r1, . . ., rn) for which the type set Θi is the same for every agent (and equal
to some set Θ0), we construct now a function r
′ : Θn−10 → R, following Moulin (1986), by
setting
r′(x) :=
n∑
j=1
∑
pi∈Π(n−1) rj(x
pi)
n!
,
where xpi is defined analogously to θpi.
Note that r′ is permutation independent, so r′ is an anonymous Groves mechanism. The
following lemma, which can be of independent interest, shows that some of the properties
of r transfer to r′.
Lemma 3.3 Consider a Groves mechanism r and the corresponding anonymous Groves
mechanism r′. Let V CG(θ) :=
∑n
i=1 V CGi(θ), and suppose that the V CG function is
permutation independent. Then:
(i) If r is non-deficit, so is r′.
(ii) If an anonymous Groves mechanism r0 is collectively dominated by r, then it is col-
lectively dominated by r′.
Proof. For all θ ∈ Θ we have
n∑
i=1
r′i(θ−i) =
∑n
i=1
∑
pi∈Π(n−1)
∑n
j=1 rj((θ−i)
pi)
n!
=
10. Our definition is slightly different than the one introduced by Moulin (1986) in that no conditions are
put on the utility functions and the permutation independence refers only to the redistribution function.
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∑n
i=1
∑
pi∈Π(n) ri(θ
pi
−i)
n!
where the last equality holds since in both terms we aggregate over all applications of all ri
functions to all permutations of n− 1 elements of θ.
Let t and t′ be the payment functions of the mechanisms r and r′, respectively. We have
n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) = V CG(θ)−
n∑
i=1
r′i(θ−i)
and for all π ∈ Π(n)
n∑
i=1
ti(θ
pi) = V CG(θpi)−
n∑
i=1
ri(θ
pi
−i).
Hence by the assumption about V CG(θ) it follows that
n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) =
∑
pi∈Π(n)
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
pi)
n!
(2)
(i) is now an immediate consequence of (2).
To prove (ii) let t0 be the payment function of r0. r collectively dominates r0, so for all
θ ∈ Θ and all π ∈ Π(n)
n∑
i=1
ti(θ
pi) ≤
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ
pi)
with at least one inequality strict. Hence for all θ ∈ Θ∑
pi∈Π(n)
∑n
i=1 ti(θ
pi)
n!
≤
∑
pi∈Π(n)
∑n
i=1 t
0
i (θ
pi)
n!
with at least one inequality strict.
But the fact that r0 is anonymous and the assumption about V CG(θ) imply that for
all θ ∈ Θ and all permutations π of {1, . . ., n}
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ
pi) =
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ),
so by (2) and the above inequality, we have that for all θ ∈ Θ
n∑
i=1
t′i(θ) ≤
n∑
i=1
t0i (θ),
with at least one inequality strict. 2
The assumption in Lemma 3.3 of permutation independence of V CG(θ) is satisfied in
both of the domains that we consider in Sections 5 and 6. So item (ii) states that if a Groves
mechanism considered in the sequel is not collectively undominated, then it is collectively
dominated by an anonymous Groves mechanism.
We now prove that for a large class of Groves mechanisms that includes the ones we
study in the sequel the introduced relations of dominance differ.
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Theorem 3.4 Suppose n ≥ 3. Assume that the sets of types Θi are all equal to the set Θ0
which contains at least n−1 elements. Then two non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanisms
r and r′ exist such that r collectively dominates r′ but r does not individually dominate r′.
Proof. Fix a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism determined by a permutation
independent function r : Θn−10 → R.
Let a1, . . ., an−1 be arbitrary different elements of Θ0. Define a permutation independent
function q : Θn−10 → R by putting
q(x) :=
{
−1 if x is a permutation of (a1, . . ., an−1)
2 otherwise
Then for each θ ∈ Θn0 at most two of its subsequences θ−i may form a permutation
of (a1, . . ., an−1). But n ≥ 3, so for all θ ∈ Θ,
∑n
i=1 q(θ−i) ≥ 0. This implies that the
anonymous Groves mechanism determined by the function r′ := r − q is non-deficit.
Trivially, the sum of payments under r is less than or equal to the sum of payments
under r′, since r redistributes more money than r′. Moreover for some θ ∈ Θ, for instance
θ = (a1, . . ., a1), we have
∑n
i=1 q(θ−i) > 0. Finally, by definition, q(a1, . . ., an−1) = −1.
These imply that r′ is collectively dominated by r but is not individually dominated by
r. 2
4. Individually Undominated Mechanisms: Characterization and
Algorithmic Techniques for General Domains
In this section, we focus on individually undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms.
4.1 Non-deficit Groves Mechanisms
We start with a characterization of non-deficit Groves mechanisms. Recall first that for a
type profile θ, we denote by V CG(θ) the total VCG payment,
∑n
i=1 V CGi(θ).
Proposition 4.1 A Groves mechanism r is non-deficit if and only if for all i and all θ,
ri(θ−i) ≤ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)} (3)
Here, θ′−j are the reported types of the agents other than j when θi is replaced by θ
′
i.
Proof. We first prove the “if” direction. For any i and θ, Equation 3 implies that ri(θ−i) ≤
V CG(θ′i, θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j) for any θ
′
i ∈ Θi. If we let θ
′
i = θi, we obtain
∑
j rj(θ−j) ≤
V CG(θi, θ−i) =
∑
i V CGi(θ). Thus, the non-deficit property holds.
We now prove the “only if” direction. To ensure the non-deficit property, for any i,
any θ−i, and any θ
′
i, we must have ri(θ−i) +
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j) ≤ V CG(θ
′
i, θ−i), or equivalently
ri(θ−i) ≤ V CG(θ
′
i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j). Since θ
′
i is arbitrary, Equation 3 follows. 2
By replacing the “≤” in Equation 3 by “=”, we get a characterization of individually
undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms.
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Theorem 4.2 A Groves mechanism r is non-deficit and individually undominated if and
only if for all i and all θ,
ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)} (4)
Here, θ′−j are the reported types of the agents other than j when θi is replaced by θ
′
i.
Proof. We prove the “if” direction first. Any Groves mechanism r that satisfies Equation 4
is non-deficit by Proposition 4.1. Now suppose that r is individually dominated, that is,
there exists another non-deficit Groves mechanism r′ such that for all i and θ−i, we have
r′i(θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i), and for some i and θ−i, we have r
′
i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i). For the i and θ−i that
make this inequality strict, we have
r′i(θ−i) > ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}
≥ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
r′j(θ
′
−j)},
which contradicts with the fact that r′ must satisfy Equation 3. It follows that r is individ-
ually undominated.
Now we prove the “only if” direction. Suppose Equation 4 is not satisfied. Then,
there exists some i and θ−i such that ri(θ−i) < inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}. Let
a = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}− ri(θ−i) (so that a > 0), and let r
′ be the same as r,
except that for the aforementioned i and θ−i, r
′
i(θ−i) = ri(θ−i) + a. To show that this does
not break the non-deficit constraint, consider any type vector (θi, θ−i) where i and θ−i are
the same as before (that is, any type profile that is affected). Then,
r′i(θ−i) = a+ ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}
= inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
r′j(θ
′
−j)}.
Thus, by Proposition 4.1, r′ is non-deficit. This contradicts that r is individually undomi-
nated. Hence, Equation 4 must hold. 2
We now give an example of an individually undominated mechanism.
Example 4.3 Consider a single-item auction with n ≥ 3 agents. Agent i bids θi ∈ [0,∞).
Let [θ]j be the jth highest type from the type profile θ. Let us consider the anonymous
Groves mechanism characterized by r(θ−i) =
1
n
[θ−i]2. That is, under this mechanism,
besides paying the VCG payment, every agent receives 1
n
times the second highest other
bid. In fact, this mechanism is the BC mechanism for single-item auctions. To show that
r is individually undominated, it suffices to show Equation 4 is satisfied. We first observe
that for every agent, the second highest other bid is no more than the second highest bid,
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which equals the total VCG payment. That is, r is non-deficit. Hence, Equation 3 holds
for all agents and all type profiles. Moreover, for every type profile θ, by setting θ′i = [θ−i]2,
we can verify that Equation 4 holds. It follows that the BC mechanism is individually
undominated for single-item auctions.
In what follows, we first show two examples of single-item auction scenarios, where col-
lective undominance is strictly stronger than individual undominance for non-deficit Groves
mechanisms. We then propose two techniques for generating individually undominated
mechanisms starting from known individually dominated mechanisms (if the initial mecha-
nism is already individually undominated, then the techniques will return the same mech-
anism). One technique immediately produces an individually undominated mechanism.
However, it does not preserve anonymity. The second technique preserves anonymity, and
after repeated applications the result converges to an individually undominated mechanism.
We emphasize that we can start with any non-deficit Groves mechanism, including the BC
mechanism, the Worst-Case Optimal mechanism (Guo & Conitzer, 2009), the Optimal-in-
Expectation Linear mechanisms (Guo & Conitzer, 2010), and the VCG mechanism.
4.2 Collective Undominance is Strictly Stronger than Individual Undominance
We use two examples to show that collective undominance is, in general, strictly stronger
than individual undominance.
Example 4.4 Consider a single-item auction with 4 agents. We assume that for each
agent, the set of allowed types is the same, namely, integers from 0 to 3. Here, the VCG
mechanism is just the second-price auction.
Let us consider the following two anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanisms, which are
computer-generated for differentiating collective undominance and individual undominance.
Mechanism 1: r(θ−i) = r([θ−i]1, [θ−i]2, [θ−i]3), and the function r is given in Table 1.
([θ−i]j is the jth highest type among types other than i’s own type.)
Mechanism 2: r′(θ−i) = r
′([θ−i]1, [θ−i]2, [θ−i]3), and the function r
′ is given in Table 1.
With the above characterization, we have that mechanism 2 collectively dominates mech-
anism 1: for example, for the type profile (3, 2, 2, 2),
∑
i r(θ−i) = 1/2 < 1 =
∑
i r
′(θ−i).
On the other hand, mechanism 2 does not individually dominate mechanism 1: for exam-
ple, r(3, 3, 2) = 1 > 5/6 = r′(3, 3, 2). In fact, based on the characterization of individually
undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms (Theorem 4.2), we are able to show that mech-
anism 1 is individually undominated.
Example 4.5 Consider a single-item auction with 5 agents. We assume that for each
agent, the set of allowed types is [0,∞). Here, the VCG mechanism is just the second-price
auction.
Let us consider the following two anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanisms:
Mechanism 1:
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r(0,0,0) 0 r′(0,0,0) 0
r(1,0,0) 0 r′(1,0,0) 0
r(1,1,0) 1/4 r′(1,1,0) 1/4
r(1,1,1) 1/4 r′(1,1,1) 1/4
r(2,0,0) 0 r′(2,0,0) 0
r(2,1,0) 1/12 r′(2,1,0) 7/24
r(2,1,1) 0 r′(2,1,1) 1/6
r(2,2,0) 1/2 r′(2,2,0) 1/2
r(2,2,1) 0 r′(2,2,1) 1/4
r(2,2,2) 1/2 r′(2,2,2) 1/2
r(3,0,0) 0 r′(3,0,0) 0
r(3,1,0) 1/4 r′(3,1,0) 1/4
r(3,1,1) 0 r′(3,1,1) 1/4
r(3,2,0) 2/3 r′(3,2,0) 2/3
r(3,2,1) 1 r′(3,2,1) 19/24
r(3,2,2) 0 r′(3,2,2) 1/6
r(3,3,0) 2/3 r′(3,3,0) 5/6
r(3,3,1) 0 r′(3,3,1) 7/12
r(3,3,2) 1 r′(3,3,2) 5/6
r(3,3,3) 0 r′(3,3,3) 1/2
Table 1: Computer-generated example mechanisms for differentiating collective undomi-
nance and individual undominance.
r(θ−i) = 0 if all four types in θ−i are identical.
r(θ−i) = [θ−i]1/4 if the highest three types in θ−i are identical, and they are strictly
higher than the lowest type in θ−i.
r(θ−i) = [θ−i]1/6 if the highest two types in θ−i are identical, and they are strictly
higher than the third highest type in θ−i.
r(θ−i) = 3[θ−i]2/16 if the highest type in θ−i is strictly higher than the second highest
type in θ−i, and the second highest type in θ−i is identical to the third highest type in θ−i.
r(θ−i) = [θ−i]2/5 if the highest three types in θ−i are all different.
Mechanism 2 (BC):
r′(θ−i) = [θ−i]2/5.
With the above characterization, we have that mechanism 2 collectively dominates
mechanism 1: for example, for the type profile (3, 2, 2, 2, 2),
∑
i r(θ−i) = 4r(3, 2, 2, 2) +
r(2, 2, 2, 2) = 3/2+0 = 3/2 <
∑
i r
′(θ−i) = 4r
′(3, 2, 2, 2)+ r′(2, 2, 2, 2) = 8/5+2/5 = 2. On
the other hand, mechanism 2 does not individually dominate mechanism 1: for example,
r(4, 4, 4, 1) = 1 > 4/5 = r′(4, 4, 4, 1). In fact, based on the characterization of individu-
ally undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms (Theorem 4.2), we are able to show that
mechanism 1 is individually undominated.
4.3 A Priority-Based Technique
Given a non-deficit Groves mechanism r and a priority order over agents π, we can improve
r into an individually undominated mechanism as follows:
1) Let π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} be a permutation representing the priority order.
That is, π(i) is agent i’s priority value (the lower the value, the higher the priority). π−1(k)
is then the agent with the kth highest priority. The high-level idea of the priority-based
technique is that we go over the agents one by one. For the first agent (the agent with
the highest priority), we maximize his redistribution function subject to the constraint of
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Proposition 4.1. For later agents, we do the same, but take into consideration that earlier
agents’ redistribution functions have been updated. A priority order can be arbitrary.
Generally, agents with high priorities benefit more from this technique, since for earlier
agents, there is more room for improvement.
2) Let i = π−1(1), and update ri to
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>1
rj(θ
′
−j)}.
That is, the update ensures that at this point rpi satisfies Equation 4 for i = π−1(1).
It should be noted that during the above update, only the payment of agent i = π−1(1)
is changed, and it is changed by
rpii (θ−i)− ri(θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>1
rj(θ
′
−j)} − ri(θ−i)
= inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j
rj(θ
′
−j)} = S
BCGC
i (θ−i).
That is, essentially, the above update amounts to applying the BCGC(i) transformation
on r, where i = π−1(1).
3) We will now consider the remaining agents in turn, according to the order π. In the
kth step, we update ri (i = π
−1(k)) to
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>k
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<k
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
That is, the update ensures that at this point rpi satisfies Equation 4 when i = π−1(k). To
avoid breaking the non-deficit property, when we make the update, we take the previous
k − 1 updates into account. For this update, what we are doing is essentially applying the
BCGC(π−1(k)) transformation on the resulting mechanism from the previous update.
Overall, for every agent i,
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
The new mechanism rpi satisfies the following properties:
Proposition 4.6 For all i and θ−i, r
pi
i (θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i).
Proof. First consider i = π−1(1), the agent with the highest priority. For any θ−i, we have
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}. Since r is non-deficit, by Equation 3, we have
ri(θ−i) ≤ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rj(θ
′
−j)}. Hence r
pi
i (θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i).
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For any i 6= π−1(1), rpii (θ−i) equals
ri(θ−i) + inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)− ri(θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
We must show that
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)− ri(θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)} ≥ 0. (5)
Consider p = π−1(π(i) − 1) (the agent immediately before i in terms of priority). For
any θi, θ−i, we have
V CG(θi, θ−i)− ri(θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ−j)
= V CG(θi, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(p)
rj(θ−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(p)
rpij (θ−j)− r
pi
p (θ−p)
≥ inf
θ′p∈Θp
{V CG(θ′p, θ−p)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(p)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(p)
rpij (θ
′
−j)} − r
pi
p (θ−p) = 0.
In the above inequality, θ′−j is the set of types reported by the agents other than j, when θp
is replaced by θ′p. Because θi is arbitrary, Equation 5 follows. Therefore, r
pi
i (θ−i) ≥ ri(θ−i)
for all i and θ−i. 2
Proposition 4.7 rpi is individually undominated.
Proof. Let i = π−1(n). For all θ,
V CG(θ)−
∑
j=1,...,n
rpij (θ−j) ≥ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rpij (θ
′
−j)} − r
pi
i (θ−i) = 0.
Hence rpi never incurs a deficit. So, rpi is non-deficit.
Using Proposition 4.6, we have for all i and all θ,
rpii (θ−i) = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
pi(j)>pi(i)
rj(θ
′
−j)−
∑
pi(j)<pi(i)
rpij (θ
′
−j)}
≥ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rpij (θ
′
−j)}.
Because rpi is non-deficit, the opposite inequality must also be satisfied (Equation 3)—hence
we must have equality, that is, Equation 4 must hold. It follows that rpi is individually
undominated. 2
It should be noted that for the above technique, during the updates, we need to keep
track of the value of rpii (θ−i) for all i and θ−i. That is, due to space complexity, the above
technique is more suitable for cases with few agents and few possible types. To reduce
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space complexity, when we update, we could also recompute earlier updates in a recursive
fashion. By doing so, the later updates are much more difficult to compute compared to
the earlier updates. Fortunately, the earlier updates tend to be more important, because
there is generally more room for improvement during the earlier updates. Therefore, a
reasonable approximation would be to update only for a few high-priority agents and ignore
the remaining agents with low priorities.
4.4 An Iterative Technique that Preserves Anonymity
The previous technique will, in general, not produce an anonymous mechanism, even if the
input mechanism is anonymous. This is because agents higher in the priority order tend to
benefit more from the technique. Here, we will introduce another technique that preserves
anonymity.
Given an anonymous mechanism r, let r0 = r. For all i and all θ, let
rk+1(θ−i) =
n− 1
n
rk(θ−i) +
1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)}.
It is easily seen by induction that all the rk mechanisms are anonymous. If rk is anony-
mous, then for any π ∈ Π(n − 1), rk((θ−i)
pi) = rk(θ−i) for all θ and all i. We also have
that V CG(θ′i, (θ−i)
pi) = V CG(θ′i, θ−i) for all θ, all θ
′
i, and all i. Finally, let ((θ−i)
pi, θ′i) be
the type profile where the types in θ−i are permuted according to π, and θi is replaced by
θ′i. We have
∑
j 6=i r
k(((θ−i)
pi, θ′i)−j) =
∑
j 6=i r
k(θ′−j) for all θ, all i, and all θ
′
i. The above
implies that rk+1 is also permutation independent, thus anonymous.
It should be noted that from rk to rk+1, agent i’s payment is changed by
rk+1(θ−i)− r
k(θ−i)
= n−1
n
rk(θ−i) +
1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k(θ−i)
= 1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j
rk(θ′−j)}
= 1
n
SBCGCi (θ−i).
That is, essentially, rk+1 is the resulting mechanism by applying the BCGC transform on
rk.
The next propositions immediately follow from Proposition 2.3:
Proposition 4.8 If r0 is non-deficit, then rk is non-deficit for all k.
Proposition 4.9 For all i and θ−i, r
k(θ−i) is nondecreasing in k.
Proposition 4.10 If rk+1 = rk, then rk is individually undominated.
Proposition 4.11 If rk is not individually undominated, then rk+1 individually dominates
rk.
Finally, the following proposition establishes convergence.
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Proposition 4.12 As k → ∞, rk converges (pointwise) to an individually undominated
mechanism.
Proof. By Proposition 4.9, the rk(θ−i) are nondecreasing in k, and since every r
k is non-
deficit by Proposition 4.8, they must be bounded; hence they must converge (pointwise).
For any i and θ−i, let
dk = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k(θ−i).
Using Proposition 4.9, we derive the following inequality:
dk+1 = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk+1(θ′−j)} − r
k+1(θ−i)
≤ inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k+1(θ−i)
= inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)}
= −
n− 1
n
rk(θ−i)−
1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)}
=
n− 1
n
inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} −
n− 1
n
rk(θ−i) =
n− 1
n
dk.
As k → ∞, dk = inf
θ′i∈Θi
{V CG(θ′i, θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i
rk(θ′−j)} − r
k(θ−i) → 0. So in the limit, Equa-
tion 4 is satisfied. Thus, rk converges (pointwise, linearly) to an individually undominated
mechanism. 2
Similar to the priority-based technique, in the above iterative process, when computing
for rk, we need the value of rk−1(θ−i), for all θ−i. That is, due to space complexity, the
above technique is more suitable for cases with few agents and few possible types. To
reduce the space complexity we could also recompute rk−1 in a recursive fashion. By doing
so, rk becomes much more difficult to compute for large values of k. Fortunately, the earlier
iterative steps are more crucial, because there is generally more room for improvement
during the earlier steps. Therefore a reasonable approximation would be to only compute
a few iterative steps.
5. Multi-Unit Auctions with Unit Demand
In this section, we consider auctions where there are multiple identical units of a single
good and all agents have unit demand, i.e., each agent wants only one unit (if there is a
single unit of the good, we simply have the standard single-item auction). We focus on the
notion of collectively undominated mechanisms and how it relates to that of individually
undominated mechanisms. In particular, we first obtain an analytical characterization of
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all collectively undominated Groves mechanisms that are non-deficit, anonymous, and have
linear payment functions, by proving that the Optimal-in-Expectation Linear redistribution
mechanisms (OEL) (Guo & Conitzer, 2010), which include the BC mechanism, are the only
collectively undominated Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear. We then show
that individual undominance and collective undominance are equivalent if we restrict our
consideration to Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear in the setting of multi-
unit auctions with unit demand. Note that even for single-item auctions, the examples
given in Section 4.2 show that this equivalence does not hold if we do not restrict ourselves
to linear and anonymous mechanisms.
If one mechanism collectively dominates another mechanism, then under the first mech-
anism, the agents’ expected total utility, if there was a prior distribution over the agents’
valuations, must be no less than that under the second mechanism, and strictly higher un-
der minimal conditions on the prior distribution. Therefore, a good direction in which to
look for collectively undominated mechanisms is to start with those mechanisms that are
optimal-in-expectation.
The Optimal-in-Expectation Linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms (Guo & Conitzer,
2010), described below, are special cases of non-deficit Groves mechanisms that are anony-
mous and linear. The OEL mechanisms are defined only for multi-unit auctions with unit
demand. In a unit demand multi-unit auction, there are m indistinguishable units for sale,
and each agent is interested in only one unit. For agent i, his type θi is his valuation for
winning one unit. We assume all bids (announced types) are bounded below by L and above
by U , i.e., Θi = [L,U ] (note that L can be 0).
A linear and anonymous Groves mechanism is characterized by a function r of the fol-
lowing form: r(θ−i) = c0+
n−1∑
j=1
cj [θ−i]j (where [θ−i]j is the jth highest bid among θ−i). For
OEL mechanisms, the cj ’s are chosen according to one of the following options (indexed by
integer parameter k, where k ranges from 0 to n, and k −m is odd):
k = 0:
ci = (−1)
m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
for i = 1, . . . ,m,
c0 = Um/n− U
m∑
i=1
(−1)m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
k = 1,2, . . . ,m:
ci = (−1)
m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
for i = k + 1, . . . ,m,
ck = m/n−
m∑
i=k+1
(−1)m−i
(
n− i− 1
n−m− 1
)
/
(
m− 1
i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
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k =m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . ,n− 1:
ci = (−1)
m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
for i = m+ 1, . . . , k − 1,
ck = m/n−
k−1∑
i=m+1
(−1)m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
k = n:
ci = (−1)
m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
for i = m+ 1, . . . , n− 1,
c0 = Lm/n− L
n−1∑
i=m+1
(−1)m−i−1
(
i− 1
m− 1
)
/
(
n−m− 1
n− i− 1
)
,
ci = 0 for other values of i.
For example, when k = m+ 1, we have cm+1 = m/n and ci = 0 for all other i. For this
specific OEL mechanism, r(θ−i) =
m
n
[θ−i]m+1. That is, besides participating in the VCG
mechanism, every agent also receives an amount that is equal to m/n times the (m+ 1)th
highest bid from the other agents. Actually, this is exactly the BC mechanism for multi-unit
auctions with unit demand.
Besides being non-deficit, one property of the OEL mechanisms is that they are always
budget balanced in the following scenarios.
• [θ]1 = U and k = 0
• [θ]k+1 = [θ]k and k ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1}
• [θ]n = L and k = n
Using this property, we will prove that the OEL mechanisms are the only collectively
undominated non-deficit Groves mechanisms that are anonymous and linear.
We first show that the OEL mechanisms are collectively undominated.
Theorem 5.1 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, there is no non-deficit Groves
mechanism that collectively dominates an OEL mechanism.
By using Lemma 3.3, we only need to prove this for the case of anonymous Groves
mechanisms.
Lemma 5.2 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, there is no non-deficit anonymous
Groves mechanism that collectively dominates an OEL mechanism.
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Proof. We first prove: no OEL mechanism with index k ∈ {1, . . ., n − 1} is collectively
dominated by a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism.
Suppose a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism r collectively dominates an OEL
mechanism with index k ∈ {1, . . ., n − 1}. We use rOEL to denote this OEL mechanism.
For any i and θ−i, we define the following function:
∆(θ−i) = r(θ−i)− r
OEL(θ−i).
Since r collectively dominates rOEL, we have that for any θ,
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) ≥ 0.
We also have that, whenever [θ]k+1 = [θ]k, the OEL mechanism is budget balanced.
That is, under rOEL, the agents’ total payment is 0; in this case, since r is non-deficit, we
must have
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we claim that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. Let C(θ−i) be the number of bids among
θ−i that equal [θ−i]k. Hence, we must show that for all θ−i with C(θ−i) ≥ 1, we have
∆(θ−i) = 0.
We now prove it by induction on the value of C(θ−i) (backwards, from n− 1 to 1).
Base case: C(θ−i) = n− 1.
Suppose there is a θ−i with C(θ−i) = n − 1. That is, all the bids in θ−i are identical.
When θi is also equal to the bids in θ−i, all bids in θ are the same so that [θ]k+1 = [θ]k.
Hence, by our earlier observation, we have
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. But we know that for all j,
θ−j is the same set of bids. Hence ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i when C(θ−i) = n− 1.
Induction step.
Let us assume that for all θ−i, if C(θ−i) ≥ p (where p ∈ {2, . . ., n−1}), then ∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we consider any θ−i with C(θ−i) = p − 1. When θi is equal to [θ−i]k, we have [θ]k =
[θ]k+1, which implies that
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. For all j with θj = [θ−i]k, ∆(θ−j) = ∆(θ−i),
and for other j, C(θ−j) = p. Therefore, by the induction assumption,
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) is a
positive multiple of ∆(θ−i), which implies that ∆(θ−i) = 0.
By induction, we have shown that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. This implies that r and
rOEL are identical. Hence, no other non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism collectively
dominates an OEL mechanism with index k ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1}.
Now we prove: the OEL mechanism with index k = 0 is not collectively dominated
by a different non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism.
Suppose a non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism r collectively dominates an OEL
mechanism with index k = 0. We use rOEL to denote this OEL mechanism. For any i and
θ−i, we define the following function:
∆(θ−i) = r(θ−i)− r
OEL(θ−i).
Since r collectively dominates rOEL, we have that for any θ,
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) ≥ 0. We also
have that, whenever [θ]1 = U , under r
OEL, the agents’ total payment is 0; in this case,
because r is non-deficit, we must have
∑n
i=1∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we claim that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. Let C(θ−i) be the number of bids among θ−i
that equal U . Hence, we must show that for all θ−i with C(θ−i) ≥ 0, we have ∆(θ−i) = 0.
We now prove it by induction on the value of C(θ−i) (backwards, from n− 1 to 0).
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Base case: C(θ−i = n− 1.
Suppose there is a θ−i with C(θ−i) = n− 1. That is, all the bids in θ−i are equal to U .
When θi is also equal to the bids in U , by our earlier observation, we have
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0.
But we know that for all j, ∆(θ−j) is the same value. Hence ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i when
C(θ−i) = n− 1.
Induction step.
Let us assume that for all θ−i, if C(θ−i) ≥ p (where p ∈ {2, . . ., n−1}), then ∆(θ−i) = 0.
Now we consider any θ−i with C(θ−i) = p − 1. When θi is equal to U , we have [θ]1 = U ,
which implies that
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) = 0. For all j with θj = U , ∆(θ−j) = ∆(θ−i), and for
other j, C(θ−j) = p. Therefore, by the induction assumption,
∑n
j=1∆(θ−j) is a positive
multiple of ∆(θ−i), which implies that ∆(θ−i) = 0.
By induction, we have shown that ∆(θ−i) = 0 for all θ−i. This implies that r and
rOEL are identical. Hence, no other non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism collectively
dominates the OEL mechanism with index k = 0.
It remains to prove: the OEL mechanism with index k = n is not collectively domi-
nated by a different non-deficit anonymous Groves mechanism.
This case is similar to the case of k = 0 and we omit it here. 2
We now proceed to show that within the family of anonymous and linear non-deficit
Groves mechanisms, the OEL mechanisms are the only ones that are collectively undomi-
nated. Actually, they are also the only ones that are individually undominated, which is a
stronger claim since being individually undominated is a weaker property.
Theorem 5.3 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, if an anonymous linear non-
deficit Groves mechanism is individually undominated, then it must be an OEL mechanism.
Before proving this theorem, let us introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4 Let I be the set of points (s1, s2, . . . , sk) (U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sk ≥ L) that
satisfy Q0 + Q1s1 + Q2s2 + . . . + Qksk = 0 (the Qi are constants). If the measure of I is
positive (Lebesgue measure on Rk), then Qi = 0 for all i.
Proof. If Qi 6= 0 for some i, then for any U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ si−1 ≥ si+1 ≥ . . . ≥ sk ≥ L,
to make Q0 +Q1s1 +Q2s2 + . . .+Qksk = 0, si can take at most one value. As a result the
measure of I must be 0. 2
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof. Let r be a non-deficit anonymous linear Groves mechanism. We recall that a
Groves mechanism is anonymous and linear if r is a linear function defined as r(θ−i) =
a0+
n−1∑
j=1
aj [θ−i]j (where [θ−i]j is the jth highest type among θ−i, and the aj ’s are constants).
Under multi-unit auctions with unit demand, the total VCG payment equals m[θ]m+1
(m times the (m+ 1)th bid). Under r, the agents’ total payment equals
m[θ]m+1 −
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = m[θ]m+1 − na0 −
n∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aj [θ−i]j .
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The above total payment is a linear function in terms of the types among θ. For simplicity,
we rewrite the total payment as C0 + C1[θ]1 + C2[θ]2 + . . .+ Cn[θ]n. The Ci are constants
determined by the ai. We have
C0 = −na0
C1 = −(n− 1)a1
C2 = −a1 − (n− 2)a2
C3 = −2a2 − (n− 3)a3
...
Cm = −(m− 1)am−1 − (n−m)am
Cm+1 = −mam − (n−m− 1)am+1 +m
Cm+2 = −(m+ 1)am+1 − (n−m− 2)am+2
...
Cn−1 = −(n− 2)an−2 − an−1
Cn = −(n− 1)an−1
Given any θ−i, for any possible value of θi, we must have
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) ≥ 0 (non-deficit).
That is, for any θ−i, we have inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) ≥ 0. If for some θ−i, we have inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) > ǫ
(ǫ > 0), then we can reduce the payment of agent i by ǫ without violating the non-deficit
constraint, when the other agents’ types are θ−i. Therefore, if the mechanism is individually
undominated, then for any θ−i, we have inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = 0.
We denote [θ−i]j by sj (j = 1, . . . , n− 1). That is, s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1.
The expression inf
θi
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) then equals the minimum of the following expressions:
inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
inf
sn−1≤θi≤sn−2
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
...
inf
s2≤θi≤s1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
inf
s1≤θi≤U
n∑
i=1
ti(θ)
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We take a closer look at inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ). When L ≤ θi ≤ sn−1, the jth highest type
[θ]j = sj for j = 1, . . . , n − 1, and the nth highest type [θ]n = θi (this case corresponds to
agent i being the agent with the lowest type). We have
inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = inf
L≤θi≤sn−1
(C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + Cnθi)
= min{C0 + C1s1 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + CnL,C0 + C1s1 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + Cnsn−1}.
That is, because the expression is linear, the minimum is reached when θi is set to either
the lower bound L or the upper bound sn−1.
Similarly, we have
inf
sn−1≤θi≤sn−2
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = min{C0 + C1s1 + . . .+ Cn−2sn−2 + Cn−1sn−1 + Cnsn−1,
C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−2sn−2 + Cn−1sn−2 + Cnsn−1},
...
inf
s2≤θi≤s1
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = min{C0 + C1s1 + C2s1 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1,
C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1},
inf
s1≤θi≤U
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = min{C0 + C1U + C2s1 + . . .+ Cnsn−1,
C0 + C1s1 + C2s1 + . . .+ Cnsn−1}.
Putting all the above together, we have that for any U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 ≥ L, the
minimum of the following expressions is 0.
• (n): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + CnL
• (n− 1): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−1sn−1 + Cnsn−1
• (n− 2): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + . . .+ Cn−2sn−2 + Cn−1sn−2 + Cnsn−1
•
...
• (2): C0 + C1s1 + C2s2 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1
• (1): C0 + C1s1 + C2s1 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1
• (0): C0 + C1U + C2s1 + C3s2 + . . .+ Cnsn−1
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The above expressions are numbered from 0 to n. Let I(i) be the set of points (s1, . . . , sn−1)
(U ≥ s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 ≥ L) that make expression (i) equal to 0. There must exist at
least one i such that the measure of I(i) is positive. According to Lemma 5.4, expression
(i) must be the constant 0.
If expression (0) is constant 0, then the total payment under r is 0 whenever the highest
type is equal to the upper bound U . That is, for any θ, the total payment C0 + C1[θ]1 +
C2[θ]2 + . . .+Cn[θ]n must be a constant multiple of U − [θ]1 (the total payment is a linear
function). We have C0 = −UC1 and Cj = 0 for j ≥ 2. It turns out that the above equalities
of the Cj completely determine the values of the aj (the values of the aj can be solved for
based on the Cj by pure algebraic manipulations), and the corresponding mechanism is the
OEL mechanism with index k = 0. If expression (i) is constant for other values of i, then
the corresponding mechanism is the OEL mechanism with another index. 2
Hence, we have the following complete characterization in this context.
Corollary 5.5 For multi-unit auctions with unit demand, a non-deficit anonymous linear
Groves mechanism is individually / collectively undominated if and only if it is an OEL
mechanism.
Proof. This corollary can be proved by combining Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.3, as well
as the fact that a collectively undominated mechanism is also individually undominated. 2
The above corollary also shows that if we consider only Groves mechanisms that are
non-deficit, anonymous, and linear in the setting of multi-unit auctions with unit demand,
then individual undominance and collective undominance are equivalent. Thus, we have
characterized all individually/collectively undominated Groves mechanisms that are non-
deficit, anonymous, and linear for multi-unit auctions with unit demand.
6. The Public Project Problem
We now study a well known class of decision problems, namely public project problems (see,
e.g., Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Moulin, 1988; Moore, 2006). In this setting a set of n agents
needs to decide on financing a project of cost c. An agent’s type is her private valuation for
the project if it takes place. We consider two versions of the problem.
6.1 Equal Participation Costs
In this case if the project takes place, each agent contributes the same share, c/n, so as
to cover the total cost. Hence the participation costs of all agents are the same. So the
problem is defined as follows.
Public project problem
Consider (D,Θ1, . . .,Θn, v1, . . ., vn), where
• D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is canceled or takes place),
• for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, Θi = [0, c], where c > 0,
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• for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, vi(d, θi) := d(θi −
c
n
),
When the agents employ a payment-based mechanism to decide on the project, then
in addition to c/n, each agent also has to pay or receive the payment, ti(θ), imposed
by the mechanism. By the result of Holmstro¨m (1979), the only efficient and strategy-
proof payment-based mechanisms in this domain are Groves mechanisms. To determine the
efficient outcome for a given type vector θ, note that
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi) = d(
∑n
i=1 θi− c). Hence
efficiency here for a mechanism (f, t) means that f(θ) = 1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c and f(θ) = 0
otherwise, i.e., the project takes place if and only if the declared total value that the agents
have for the project exceeds its cost.
We first observe the following result.
Proposition 6.1 In the public project problem with equal participation costs, the BC mech-
anism coincides with VCG.
Proof. It suffices to check that in equation (1) it holds that SBCGCi (θ−i) = 0 for all i
and all θ−i. Since VCG is a non-deficit mechanism, we have S
BCGC
i (θ−i) ≥ 0, as the term
SBCGCi (θ−i) is a sum of payments for some type vector. Hence all we need is to show that
there is a value for θ′i that makes the expression in (1) equal to 0. Checking this is quite
simple. If
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c, then we take θ′i := 0 and otherwise θ
′
i := c. In the former case
the efficient outcome is to not implement the project whereas in the latter case, the opposite
occurs. It is easy to check that in both cases we have SBCGCi (θ−i) = 0. 2
We now show that in fact VCG cannot be improved upon. Before stating our result, we
would like to note that one ideally would like to have a mechanism that is budget-balanced,
i.e.,
∑
i ti(θ) = 0 for all θ, so that in total the agents only pay the cost of the project and
no more. However this is not possible, since for the public project problem, no mechanism
exists that is efficient, strategy-proof, and budget balanced (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Our
theorem below considerably strengthens this result, showing that VCG is optimal with
respect to minimizing the total payment of the agents.
Theorem 6.2 In the public project problem there exists no non-deficit Groves mechanism
that collectively dominates the VCG mechanism.
As with the case of unit-demand auctions, we first establish the desired conclusion for
anonymous Groves mechanisms and then extend it to arbitrary ones by Lemma 3.3. Notice
that VCG is anonymous in this setting and hence we can apply Lemma 3.3(ii).
Lemma 6.3 In the public project problem there exists no anonymous non-deficit Groves
mechanism that collectively dominates the VCG mechanism.
Proof. Suppose that an anonymous non-deficit Groves mechanism (r1, ..., rn) exists that
collectively dominates VCG. By anonymity, for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} ri = r, for some function
r : [0, c]n−1 → R. Hence
∀ θ ∈ [0, c]n
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) ≥ 0 (6)
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We will show that then for all x ∈ [0, c]n−1, r(x) = 0 and thus r coincides with VCG.
We divide our proof into two cases.
Case 1: The vector x satisfies
n−1∑
i=1
xi ≥
n− 1
n
c.
Given such an x, define C(x) = |{i : xi = c}|, i.e., given a vector x of n− 1 types, C(x)
is the number of agents who submitted c. Define the following predicate:
P (k) : ∀x ∈ [0, c]n−1 ((C(x) = k ∧
n−1∑
i=1
xi ≥
n− 1
n
c)→ r(x) = 0)
We now prove that P (k) holds for all k ∈ {0, . . ., n − 1}, using induction (going back-
wards from n− 1). Let ti(θ) = V CGi(θ)− r(θ−i) be the payment function of agent i under
the mechanism r.
Base case.
Let x be such that C(x) = n − 1. Consider θ := (c, . . ., c) ∈ [0, c]n. Then for all
i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, θ−i = x. Clearly f(θ) = 1 and no agent is paying anything under the VCG
mechanism in this instance, i.e., V CGi(θ) = 0.
Since r is a non-deficit mechanism
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
n∑
i=1
V CGi(θ)−
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = −
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = −nr(x),
But then by (6) we have r(x) = 0.
Induction step.
Assume P (k) holds for some k ≥ 1. We will prove P (k − 1). Let x be such that
C(x) = k − 1 (note that x may have zero c’s). Since r is permutation independent, we can
assume without loss of generality that the elements of x are sorted in descending order (i.e.,
r(x) does not change by such a reordering). Consider the type vector θ = (c, x), that is the
concatenation of (c) and x. Hence θ starts with k c’s and the rest is like the rest of x. Note
that for i ∈ {1, . . ., k}, θ−i = x and C(θ−i) = k − 1. For i ∈ {k + 1, . . ., n}, C(θ−i) = k,
therefore by induction hypothesis, r(θ−i) = 0. This means that
∑n
i=1 r(θ−i) = kr(x).
Furthermore, f(θ) = 1 since θ has at least one c, and no agent is paying payment under
the VCG mechanism. To see this, if k ≥ 2, then for every agent under θ, there is another
agent who submitted c hence the agent is not pivotal. If k = 1, then no agent can alter the
decision outcome by the fact that
∑
xi ≥
n−1
n
· c, hence no agent is pivotal in this case as
well. Thus, for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, V CGi(θ) = 0, and because r is non-deficit
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = −
n∑
i=1
r(θ−i) = −kr(x)
But then by (6) we have that r(x) = 0. This concludes the induction step and consequently
r(x) = 0 for all vectors x that belong to Case 1.
Case 2: The vector x satisfies
n−1∑
i=0
xi <
n− 1
n
c. The proof for this case uses a completely
symmetric argument to that of Case 1. We include it below for the sake of completeness.
156
Undominated Groves Mechanisms
Define C ′(x) = |{i : xi = 0}|. In analogy to the predicate P (k) of Case 1, we define the
following predicate:
P ′(k) : ∀x ∈ [0, c]n−1((C ′(x) = k ∧
n−1∑
i=0
xi <
n− 1
n
c)→ r(x) = 0)
We now prove that P ′(k) holds for all k ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, using induction (going back-
wards from n− 1).
Base case.
Let x be such that C ′(x) = n− 1, i.e., the zero vector. Consider θ := (0, ..., 0) ∈ [0, c]n.
Then for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, θ−i = x. Clearly f(θ) = 0 and no agent is paying anything
under the VCG mechanism. Hence if ti(θ) is the payment paid by agent i, then
∑
ti(θ) =
−
∑
r(θ−i) = −nr(x).
Since r is a non-deficit mechanism,
0 ≤
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) = −nr(x)
Then by (6) this implies that r(x) = 0.
Induction step.
Suppose P ′(k) holds for some k ≥ 1. We will prove P ′(k − 1). Let x be such that
C ′(x) = k−1. Since r is permutation independent, we can assume without loss of generality
that the elements of x are sorted in increasing order so that all 0’s are on the left side of
x (note that it may also be that x does not have any 0’s, since k − 1 maybe equal to 0).
Consider the type vector θ = (0, x). So θ starts with k 0’s and the rest is like the rest of x.
Note that for i ∈ {1, . . ., k}, θ−i = x and C
′(θ−i) = k−1. For i ∈ {k+1, . . ., n}, C
′(θ−i) = k
and by induction hypothesis, r(θ−i) = 0 and hence
∑
r(θ−i) = kr(x).
We note that f(θ) = 0 and that also no agent is paying payment under the VCG
mechanism. To see this, it is enough to verify that no agent is pivotal, which follows by
the fact that we are in the case that
∑n−1
i=0 xi <
n−1
n
c. Since θ = (0, x), no agent can be
pivotal. Therefore V CGi(θ) = 0 for every i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. Since r is non-deficit we have
0 ≤ −
∑
r(θ−i) = −kr(x). By (6) we have r(x) = 0.
This completes the proof of the induction step and hence Case 2. Since Cases 1 and 2
cover all vectors x ∈ [0, c]n−1, the proof of the Lemma is complete. 2
By using now Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 3.3(ii), the proof of Theorem 6.2 is complete.
An interesting open question is whether other mechanisms that share some of the prop-
erties of the VCG mechanism are also collectively undominated. In particular, we have
exhibited that VCG is a pay-only and anonymous mechanism. Are there other anonymous
or pay-only mechanisms that are collectively undominated for the public project problem
with equal participation costs?
We start with pay-only mechanisms. We provide a general observation that holds in
many domains other than public project problems, showing that the VCG mechanism dom-
inates all other pay-only mechanisms.
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Lemma 6.4 Let r be a Groves mechanism. Suppose that the following condition 11 holds
for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}:
∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i ∃b
∗
i ∈ Θi such that V CGi(b
∗
i , θ−i)− ri(θ−i) = 0.
Then r individually dominates all other pay-only Groves mechanisms.
The condition essentially says that every agent is always able to make his payment equal
to 0 for any type vector θ−i of the other agents.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a pay-only mechanism r′ = (r′1, . . ., r
′
n) different from
r = (r1, . . ., rn) and not dominated by r. Then, for some θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ {1, . . .n}, r
′
i(θ−i) >
ri(θ−i). Let b
∗
i be the type of agent i that satisfies the condition of the theorem. Consider
θ′ = (b∗i , θ−i). Then V CGi(θ
′) = ri(θ−i).
But then the payment of agent i under mechanism r′ for the profile θ′ is
t′i(θ
′) = V CGi(θ
′)− r′i(θ−i) < V CGi(θ
′)− ri(θ−i) = 0,
which is a contradiction, because r′ is a pay-only mechanism. 2
Theorem 6.5 Consider the public project problem with equal participation costs. Then for
a pay-only Groves mechanism r, the following are equivalent:
1. r is individually undominated,
2. r is the VCG mechanism,
3. r is collectively undominated.
Proof. 1 → 2. Consider a pay-only and individually undominated Groves mechanism r.
We claim that r is the VCG mechanism.
In the considered domain every agent i, given θ−i, can force his VCG payment to be 0
by declaring b∗i = c/n. Indeed, we then would have V CGi(c/n, θ−i) = 0. Hence by Lemma
6.4 the VCG mechanism individually dominates all other pay-only mechanisms. This means
that there can be no other individually undominated mechanism than VCG.
2→ 3 holds by Theorem 6.2 and 3→ 1 holds by the definition. 2
The above theorem shows that for the public project problem with equal participation
costs, VCG is the only pay-only Groves mechanism that is individually/collectively un-
dominated. In Appendix A, we show a similar result for anonymous Groves mechanisms,
but only for the case of two agents. That is, if there are exactly two agents, VCG is the
only anonymous Groves mechanism that is individually/collectively undominated. Further,
for n ≥ 3, Herve´ Moulin (private communication) observed that for public project prob-
lems with equal participation costs, the VCG mechanism is not the only non-deficit Groves
mechanism that is collectively undominated.
11. This is a slight generalization of the Potential for Universal Relevance Nullification (PURN) condition
introduced by Cavallo (2006). An agent satisfies PURN if he can make his payment under the VCG
mechanism equal to 0 for any type vector θ−i of the other agents. Here, the only difference is that we
consider all Groves mechanisms instead of just VCG.
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6.2 The General Case
The assumption that we have made so far in the public project problem that each agent’s
cost share is the same may not always be realistic. Indeed, it may be argued that ‘richer’
agents (such as larger enterprises) should contribute more. Does it matter if we modify the
formulation of the problem appropriately? The answer is ‘yes’. First, let us formalize this
version of the problem. We assume now that each initial utility function is of the form
vi(d, θi) := d(θi − ci),
where for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, ci > 0 and
∑n
i=1 ci = c.
In this setting, ci is the share of the project cost to be financed by agent i. We call the
resulting problem the general public project problem . It is taken fromMoore (2006). For
this problem we have only two results, both concerning the individual dominance relation.
Theorem 6.6 In the general public project problem the VCG mechanism individually dom-
inates all other pay-only Groves mechanisms.
Proof. Note that for any i and any θ−i, agent i can force his VCG payment to be 0 by
declaring ci, since ti(ci, θ−i) = 0. By Lemma 6.4 the proof is complete. 2
The above theorem cannot be extended to non-deficit Groves mechanisms, as is il-
lustrated by the following theorem. The theorem below also shows that if there is an
individually undominated mechanism in this setting, it cannot be a pay-only mechanism.
Theorem 6.7 For any n ≥ 3, an instance of the general public project problem with n
agents exists for which the BC mechanism individually dominates the VCG mechanism.
Proof. We will show this for n = 3. For n > 3, it is fairly simple to extend the proof.
We omit the details. The VCG mechanism is non-deficit, hence it suffices to show by
Proposition 2.3(ii) that the VCG and BC mechanisms do not coincide, for some choice of
c, c1, c2, c3, with c1 + c2 + c3 = c.
To this end we need to find θ2 and θ3 so that S
BCGC
1 (θ2, θ3) > 0. Here
SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) := min
θ′
1
∈Θ1
((R1 +R2 +R3)− L),
where for θ′ := (θ′1, θ2, θ3)
L := (n− 1)
n∑
k=1
vk(f(θ
′), θ′k),
R1 = max
d∈D
∑
j 6=1
vj(d, θ
′
j) = max{0, θ2 + θ3 − (c2 + c3)},
R2 = max
d∈D
∑
j 6=2
vj(d, θ
′
j) = max{0, θ
′
1 + θ3 − (c1 + c3)},
R3 = max
d∈D
∑
j 6=3
vj(d, θ
′
j) = max{0, θ
′
1 + θ2 − (c1 + c2)}.
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Now, take c = 100, c1 = 10, c2 = 40, c3 = 50 and θ2 := 10, θ3 := 70. Then R1+R2+R3 =
θ′1 + 10 +max{0, θ
′
1 − 40}. Two cases arise.
Case 1 f(θ′) = 0.
Then L = 0, so (R1 +R2 +R3)− L ≥ 10.
Case 2 f(θ′) = 1.
Then L = 2(θ′1 + θ2 + θ3 − 100) = 2θ
′
1 − 40, so
(R1 +R2 +R3)− L = 50− θ
′
1 +max{0, θ
′
1 − 40}
≥ (50− θ′1) + (θ
′
1 − 40) ≥ 10.
This proves that SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) ≥ 10. By taking any θ
′
1 ∈ [40, 100] we see that in fact
SBCGC1 (θ2, θ3) = 10. 2
By virtue of Theorem 6.6 the BC mechanism in the above proof is not pay-only.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also
known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms.
Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget balanced. That is, under
such mechanisms, payments may flow into or out of the system of the agents, resulting
in deficits or reduced utilities for the agents. To identify non-deficit Groves mechanisms
that give the agents the highest utilities, we introduced two general measures for comparing
mechanisms in prior-free settings. Specifically, we say that a non-deficit Groves mechanism
M individually dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M ′ if for every type pro-
file, every agent’s utility under M is no less than that under M ′, and this holds with strict
inequality for at least one type profile and one agent. We say that a non-deficit Groves
mechanism M collectively dominates another non-deficit Groves mechanism M ′ if for every
type profile, the agents’ total utility (social welfare) under M is no less than that under
M ′, and this holds with strict inequality for at least one type profile. The above definitions
induce two partial orders on non-deficit Groves mechanisms. This paper mainly focused on
studying the maximal elements corresponding to these two partial orders.
A number of interesting open problems remain. Specifically,
• We provided in Section 4.2 two examples showing that collective undominance is
strictly stronger than individual undominance. One example involves a discrete type
space, while the other example involves discontinuous redistribution functions. It
remains to be seen whether the two definitions of undominance coincide when the
type space is smoothly connected and the redistribution functions are continuous.
• We know from Guo and Conitzer (2010) that the OEL mechanisms are not the only
collectively undominated mechanisms in multi-unit auctions with unit demand, be-
cause there exist prior distributions under which other mechanisms achieve strictly
higher expected social welfare. That is, for multi-unit auctions with unit demand,
there exist other unknown collectively undominated mechanisms (based on nonlinear
redistribution functions). However, it remains to be seen whether there also exist
collectively undominated mechanisms (other than VCG) for public project problems.
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• We proposed two techniques for generating individually undominated mechanisms.
Can we also derive techniques for generating collectively undominated mechanisms?
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Appendix A. Uniqueness of VCG for the Case of Two Agents
Theorem A.1 Consider the public project problem with equal participation costs. When
the number of agents is n = 2, then for a non-deficit, and anonymous Groves mechanism
r, the following are equivalent:
1. r is individually undominated,
2. r is the VCG mechanism,
3. r is collectively undominated.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6.5 it suffices to show that 1→ 2. So take a non-deficit,
anonymous, and individually undominated Groves mechanism, determined by the function
r.
For x ∈ [0, c], take θ := (x, x). If x ≥ c/2, then the efficient outcome is f(θ) = 1 and
no agent is pivotal, hence the total VCG payment is 0. If x < c/2, then the project is not
built and again no agent is pivotal. Hence in both cases the VCG payment is 0. If t is
the payment function corresponding to r, then we have that t1(θ) + t2(θ) = −2r(x). Since
r is non-deficit, we have that for every x ∈ [0, c], r(x) ≤ 0. But since r is individually
undominated, it cannot be the case that r(x) < 0 for some x, because then the VCG
mechanism would dominate r. Hence r coincides with the VCG mechanism. 2
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